The referee is not enough
The textbook role of government in a market economy is the referee's. Write clear rules, enforce contracts, keep the pitch level, blow the whistle on fouls, and otherwise stay out of the way. Much of Nigeria's reform effort has been an attempt to become a better referee: removing fuel subsidies, unifying the exchange rate, rewriting the tax code, and trying to lock good rules into law so that no future government can quietly reverse them.
That work was necessary. It was never going to be sufficient. A referee can make a match fair; he cannot make a weak team good. Nigeria's economic team is weak where it matters most: in its ability to make things the rest of the world wants to buy. More than four-fifths of our exports are still oil or oil-related. In nearly two decades, a country of a quarter of a billion people has added only a handful of new export products. We are, as the development economist Chema Triki has put it, growing without learning.
The argument of this article is simple. The Nigerian government must be a coach , not just a referee. A coach does not play the match himself. But he picks the squad, sets the game plan, runs the training sessions, reviews the tape every week, drops players who do not perform, and is judged by one thing only: whether the team wins. Every economy that has moved from poverty to prosperity in the last seventy years, from Seoul to Tangier, had a government that behaved this way. Nigeria has done it too, once or twice, and the results were spectacular. It has also done it badly, many times, and the results were ruinous. The difference between the two is not whether the state intervened. It is how it coached.
The coach's mandate
Chema Triki, co-founder of the advisory firm Growth Teams, has captured the idea in a football analogy that deserves to become a policy principle: "The government is not only the referee. The government should be the coach." (The Africa Report) The diagnosis behind it is stark. Nigeria ranks 141st of 145 countries on economic complexity; oil and oil-related products make up more than 85% of exports, and only nine new export products have been added since 2007 (African Business). The remedy is to build new productive capabilities and export them, rather than lean on a protected domestic market, accepting that any sector chosen is a strategic bet.
Every coaching state faces the same dilemma: how to build businesses capable of competing abroad without handing a few industrial giants a permanent advantage . Back the players, but never let any player believe his place in the team is guaranteed.
Three principles define what a coaching mandate should mean in Nigeria.
First, the coach coaches for the club, not for the players. A good coach wants his players to succeed, but their success is the means; the club's success is the end. A coaching state supports firms because, and only to the extent that, their winning advances national goals: jobs, foreign exchange, tax revenue, skills and resilience. Support that makes a firm rich without making the country stronger is not coaching. It is sponsorship. And because the club is the nation, the rewards of winning should be owned widely by Nigerians, not only by the firms the state chose to back.
Second, coaching is about execution, not just strategy. Nigeria has never lacked plans. Vision 2010, Vision 20
, the NIRP, the ERGP and successive national development plans. What we have lacked is the weekly discipline of checking whether the plan is being executed, by whom, and what is in the way. In my essay on organising ability, I argued that the probability of a Nigerian policy being implemented falls with every additional agency it depends on. A coach exists precisely to make the handoffs work.Third, Nigerians already understand coaching. In my review of apprenticeship, I described how the Igbo Igba Boi system and its Yoruba and Hausa equivalents move young people from dependency to ownership: the master selects the apprentice, trains him on the job, disciplines him, and, at the end, settles him with capital to start on his own. That is coaching in its purest form, rigorous, conditional, and aimed at independence. Our markets coach. Our state does not. The task is to teach the state what the market already knows.
What a coaching government actually does
A coaching state does six things a referee state does not. It keeps every refereeing duty, because a coach who also bends the rules for his favourites destroys the league, but it adds a second job on top.
| Function | The referee state | The coaching state |
|---|---|---|
| Strategy | Neutral between sectors; lets the market decide | Makes a small number of explicit strategic bets and says why |
| Selection | Licenses anyone who meets the rules | Backs firms that commit to measurable targets; drops those that miss them |
| Training | Leaves skills and technology to firms | Builds shared capabilities: research institutes, testing labs, technical training, technology transfer deals |
| Performance review | Audits compliance after the fact | Sets export, output, and local-content targets and reviews them monthly, at the highest level |
| Problem-solving | Waits for complaints | Removes blockages in real time: a port delay, a power connection, a missing permit |
| Exit | Rarely withdraws support once given | Writes the end date into every concession; protection is earned and temporary |
Three principles hold the table together.
Reciprocity. Every naira of support, whether a tariff, a tax holiday, cheap credit or an import licence, comes with a performance obligation. The economist Alice Amsden called this the "reciprocal control mechanism" that separated East Asia's successful industrial policy from Latin America's failed version: subsidies flowed only in exchange for performance, and especially export performance. Nigeria's own economic managers have increasingly made the same argument: protection should be temporary and tied to measurable performance (Premium Times via allAfrica).
The away game is the real test. A coach does not judge his team by how it plays against weaker local sides on a familiar pitch. He judges it by how it performs away from home. For an economy, the away game is the export market. Selling to captive domestic consumers behind a 60% tariff proves nothing. Selling to a buyer in Lagos who could equally have bought from Guangzhou, or to a buyer in Accra, Nairobi, or Rotterdam, proves everything. Export performance is the one metric that cannot be faked by protection.
The coach does not play. The coaching state is not the entrepreneurial state that owns and runs factories. Nigeria has tried that; Ajaokuta, the refineries and the old national airline are the memorials. In my essay on the trading sector, I put it as "government as architect, not operator". The coach shapes, trains, selects and pushes; the private firm takes the field and takes the risk.
The prize is shared. When the public carries part of a firm's early risk, through higher prices behind a tariff wall, forgone taxes or cheap credit, the public should own part of the upside. A coaching state therefore requires the champions it builds to become publicly listed companies, owned in part by ordinary Nigerians. The Nigeria section below sets out how.
Lessons from Asia: coaching as a system, not a favour
What distinguishes Asia's success stories is not that their governments intervened. Many governments intervene. It is that intervention became a routine , with targets, reviews and consequences that ran month after month regardless of who was in favour.
South Korea: the monthly match review. In 1961 Korea exported about $42 million of goods; the first five-year plan set a target of $117.5 million by 1966, which looked absurd at the time (JoongAng Daily). The instrument that closed the gap was mundane. From 1965, the president chaired a monthly Export Promotion Meeting attended by ministers, the central bank, trade bodies and business leaders. Annual export targets were broken down by ministry, overseas mission, industry and individual firm, and each meeting checked performance against them. Park Chung-hee personally attended 147 of the 152 meetings held, and the targets were met every year (Korean Business History Association study). Firms that delivered received awards and preferential credit; firms that missed were asked, in front of their peers, why. That is a coach reviewing the tape after every match, and it is the single most transferable institution in this article.
Taiwan: the training ground. Taiwan's government created the Industrial Technology Research Institute in 1973, negotiated a semiconductor technology-transfer deal with RCA in 1976, spun off the demonstration plant as UMC in 1980, and in 1987 spun off TSMC, now the world's largest contract chipmaker (Wikipedia: ITRI). The state put up roughly half of TSMC's seed capital and brought in Philips as a partner (Domino Theory), then let the firm compete on the world market. The lesson is that the coach builds the capabilities no single firm can afford to build, and then hands them over.
Bangladesh: the coach who listens to his players. Bangladesh's garment industry, now worth tens of billions of dollars a year, began with one joint venture in 1978 between Desh Garments and Korea's Daewoo, which trained 130 Bangladeshi workers and managers in Busan. By the end of the 1980s, 115 of those 130 had set up their own garment firms (Zia Archive). The financing innovations that made the industry possible, the back-to-back letter of credit and the bonded warehouse, were devised by an entrepreneur, Noorul Quader, and adopted by the central bank and government when he made the case (RMG Times). A good coach does not need to invent every play. He needs to recognise a good one when a player proposes it, and make it the team's standard.
Indonesia: changing the rules of the game to change the game. Indonesia banned exports of raw nickel ore from 2020, forcing processing onshore. Nickel-related exports rose from roughly $1.1 billion six years earlier to $20.9 billion in 2021 (Katadata). Critics point out that much of this value was transferred from miners to tax-exempt smelters and that export figures overstate domestic value added (The Conversation). Both things are true, which is exactly the point: a bold coaching move needs honest measurement, or it becomes a subsidy dressed as a strategy.
China: knowing when to take the stabilisers off. China spent an estimated 300 billion yuan (about $47 billion) in central and local subsidies on electric vehicles from 2009, but cut local subsidies to half the central amount from 2017, stepped the central subsidy down each year from 2018, and ended it entirely on 31 December 2022 (Asian Century Stocks). BYD and its peers were pushed into open competition, and now win abroad. The cautionary half of the story is that some local governments kept propping up loss-making firms after Beijing withdrew (Reason). A coach who cannot drop a failing player ends up with a squad full of them.
The common thread is not the size of the subsidy. It is the regularity of the review, the conditionality of the support, and the willingness to withdraw it.
Lessons from Africa: it has been done here
The most common objection to coaching states is that they are an East Asian peculiarity that cannot travel. Africa's own record says otherwise.
Mauritius: a coach who switched the team's sport. At independence in 1968, sugar was 30% of Mauritian GDP and 90% of its exports. In 1970 the government passed the Export Processing Zone Act, offering duty-free inputs and tax relief on one condition: firms had to export everything they made. By March 1973, 34 new factories had opened, and over 14,000 jobs had been created (UNCTAD). The coach then kept moving the team up the league, from textiles to tourism, financial services and ICT. About 90% of EPZ entrepreneurs were Mauritian (Wikipedia: Economy of Mauritius), proof that conditional incentives can build a domestic business class, not just host foreign ones.
Morocco: building the whole pitch, then inviting the star player. Renault chose Tangier largely because Morocco had assembled a coherent package of port, industrial zones and connecting infrastructure around Tanger Med (Tanger Med). The 2014–2020 Industrial Acceleration Plan then organised suppliers into "ecosystems", with land, incentives and training for 90,000 workers. By 2023, automotive exports had reached $14.1 billion, local integration was 69%, and cars had overtaken phosphates as the kingdom's top export (Yabiladi). Morocco did not ask Renault to win alone; it coached a supplier base to win alongside it.
Ethiopia: a bold play, with a warning. Ethiopia built Hawassa Industrial Park, opened in 2017, to employ 60,000 people and earn $1 billion a year in apparel exports. By March 2019, its industrial parks employed 70,000 people, 80% of them women (Cepheus Capital). But exports stayed far below target, and civil war and the loss of AGOA access drove factories out (The Reporter). The lesson is not that the coaching failed; it is that a coach cannot win if the stadium is on fire. Security and macro stability are the referee's work, and they come first.
Kenya: the state that learned to coach. Kenya's horticulture boom was led by private growers and exporters, and the World Bank notes that government initially played an ambiguous role before gradually learning to act as a facilitator (World Bank). Today its plant-health inspectorate, KEPHIS, is credited with the standards regime behind Kenya's 38% share of EU rose imports (The Standard). The coach's job here was quality control: making sure every Kenyan box of roses in Amsterdam reinforced the national brand.
Nigeria: cement, the proof we already own. In 2002, Nigeria imported over 70% of its cement, and installed capacity was about 3 million tonnes a year. The Obasanjo government's backward integration policy restricted imports and, crucially, tied import licences to investment in local production capacity, with strict monitoring of compliance (Nairametrics). Around $8 billion was invested between 2003 and 2009 (Oxford Business Group). By December 2017, capacity had reached 44 million tonnes, and Nigeria had become a net exporter (Nairametrics).
That is textbook coaching: a strategic bet on a resource we had in abundance, support conditional on performance, and monitoring that bit. It also illustrates Dr Triki's caveat. The cement market that emerged is highly concentrated, and the coach never fully completed the final stage of opening it to vigorous competition once the industry had matured. Cement shows that Nigeria can coach. It also shows that we have treated coaching as a one-off campaign rather than a permanent discipline.
Nigeria: from occasional coaching to a coaching system
Nigeria's problem is not that it has never coached. It is that coaching has depended on a particular minister, a particular president or a particular tycoon, and has died when they left. Cement worked. Other campaigns run on the same instincts did not, because the discipline was missing.
Consider two contrasts with cement. Locally assembled vehicles have, by the Finance Ministry's own account, carried only about 5% local content despite enjoying tariffs and levies of up to 60% (Premium Times via allAfrica). That is protection without reciprocity: the team was given home advantage and never asked to win an away game. The CBN's Anchor Borrowers' Programme released ₦1.079 trillion to smallholders; the CBN itself reported only 52% of due loans repaid by early 2023, and the IMF put the figure at 24%, blaming a weak incentive structure for repayment and poor targeting (Nairametrics; Techeconomy). That is selection without review: support handed out, with no one in the dressing room checking who was actually playing.
The goal, then, is not to find the next cement. It is to make the cement method the default for every naira of support the Nigerian state gives to any firm or sector. Seven reforms would do it.
1. A monthly match review, chaired from the top. Establish a Presidential Export and Production Council on the Korean model: monthly, chaired by the President or Vice-President, attended by the economic ministers, the CBN, NEPC, the Customs Service, the port and power regulators, state governors on rotation, and the CEOs of firms receiving significant support. Each meeting reviews published targets by sector and by firm, and ends with named officials responsible for named blockages by a named date. Proposals for an annual National Economic Scorecard already exist at federal level (Premium Times via allAfrica). Make it monthly, make it sectoral, and make it the agenda of the most important meeting in Abuja.
2. No support without a contract. Every tariff, waiver, import licence, pioneer status, concessional loan or land grant should come with a published performance agreement: output, local content, exports, jobs, and an end date. Policy Impact Assessments that state in advance the conditions under which an intervention ends, an idea already proposed at federal level, are exactly the right instrument (Premium Times via allAfrica). Put it in law, not in a memo. The template already exists: the cement policy's linking of import licences to verified investment.
| Support given | Obligation attached | Reviewed | Exit rule |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import tariff or levy | Local-content and capacity milestones, year by year | Monthly council; annual independent audit | Steps down on a published schedule; ends on missed milestones |
| Tax holiday or capital credit | Investment actually made, jobs created, exports achieved | Annual, against tax filings | Clawed back if targets missed |
| Concessional credit (BOI, DBN, NEXIM) | Repayment, plus output or export targets | Quarterly, per borrower, published | No new lending to defaulters or their associates |
| Export incentive | Verified export receipts | Per shipment | Automatic; no discretion |
| Land or zone allocation | Factory built and operating within a set period | Annual site inspection | Land revoked and reallocated |
3. Share the prize: supported champions must list on the NGX. Any firm that receives significant, sustained support from the state, whether protection, a licence tied to an import or resource privilege, concessional finance, or tax relief above a set threshold, should commit as a condition of that support to list on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) within a fixed period, and to offer a meaningful share of its equity to Nigerian retail and institutional investors.
The case rests on fairness first. Citizens who paid more for cement, sugar or rice while an industry was protected, or whose taxes funded a firm's cheap credit, have earned the right to share in its success. But listing also does four things a coach needs. It forces audited, published accounts, which makes the performance contract verifiable. It subjects management to independent directors and minority shareholders. It gives pension funds and ordinary savers long-term naira assets in the real economy. And it makes a champion harder to treat as a private fiefdom of the politically connected.
There are precedents to build on. Dangote Cement, the flagship of backward integration, listed in 2010 and lifted the exchange's total capitalisation by about a third in a single day (Reuters via Investing.com). MTN Nigeria's 2019 listing fulfilled a key condition of its settlement with the Nigerian authorities (Mail & Guardian), proof that the state can attach a listing obligation to a privilege it grants. Kenya's 2008 Safaricom offer drew about 820,000 local retail investors (Euromoney).
The design must learn from the weaknesses of those precedents. MTN listed by introduction, so existing shareholders' shares were listed without any new sale to the public. Many Safaricom retail investors later sold at a loss when the price stayed below the offer price for years, and institutions gradually displaced them (Business Daily). The rule should therefore set a minimum free float, reserve a tranche for retail investors with fair pricing, fix a timetable, and claw back support from any firm that misses its listing deadline.
4. Few bets, clearly named. Dr Triki is right that sector choices are strategic bets. A coach who tries to play every position plays none well. Nigeria should name a small number of priority export value chains, chosen where we already have raw material, scale or skills and where regional or global demand is proven: agro-processing through the Special Agro-Industrial Processing Zones; building materials, where cement gives us a head start; leather, garments and light manufacturing in clusters such as Aba; pharmaceuticals; and processed solid minerals. In the private enterprise imperative, I proposed export trading houses on the Korean and Japanese model to aggregate output from many manufacturers; in the trading-sector essay, anchor distributor agreements with measurable commitments on offtake and coverage. Both are coaching contracts by another name.
5. Build the training ground. The coach must supply what no single firm can: testing and certification labs accredited in our export markets (Kenya's KEPHIS is the model); a Nigerian equivalent of Taiwan's ITRI, built by consolidating and refocusing existing institutes such as FIIRO and PRODA on firms' actual technical problems; and technology-transfer deals with foreign investors, Desh–Daewoo style, that train Nigerian managers who will later found their own firms. Our apprenticeship tradition should be formalised as the shop-floor layer of this system.
6. Make the states assistant coaches. Land, industrial estates, feeder roads, embedded power, market regulation and most vocational training sit with the states. A federal export strategy that states do not execute will fail at the handoff, as I documented in Organising Ability and Progress. Federal support for each priority value chain should be tied to compacts with the host states, with their deliverables on the same monthly scorecard.
7. Pay the coach. Coaching costs money: labs, research institutes, export finance, inspectors and a civil service capable of reading a firm's accounts. As I argued in The $130 Government, a state that spends about $130 per citizen a year cannot coach anything. Fixing revenue is not separate from industrial policy. It is the precondition for it.